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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CLARK BAMBROUGH,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 14320
vs.
RAY BETHERS, dba
Ray Bethers Trucking,
and DANNY SHIMIZU,
Defendants and
Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiff claimed the defendants' negligence caused
him personal injuries.

Defendants claim plaintiff was an

employee of the defendant Bethers and/or in the same employment
with both defendants for purposes of the Utah Workmens
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Compensation statutes, and that Workmens Compensation
was plaintiff's exclusive remedy.

Pursuant to stipulation

of the parties, issues raised by these defenses were tried
separately from questions of liability and damage.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The employment issues relevant to the Workmens
Compensation defenses were tried before a jury on a special
verdict.

Based upon the jury's responses to the propositions

set forth in the special verdict, the court entered a
Judgment of Dismissal dated September 25, 19 75 (R. 6-7).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants pray that the trial court judgment
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On January 15, 1973 the plaintiff drove a
tractor and trailer owned by D & L Corporation onto the
defendant Bethers business premises to deliver a load of
wood paneling to Denver, Colorado(R-284). The load plaintiff
was to deliver had to be transferred from a trailer owned by
the defendant Bethers and onto the trailer owned by D & L
(R-252).
-2-
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2.

Prior to the time plaintiff arrived, the

defendant Bethers then dispatcher, Clair Anderson, called
the owner of D & L Corporation, and made verbal arrangements
that D & L would trip lease its truck and trailer to Bethers
for the trip to Colorado (R-207-208).

Mr. Anderson recalls

discussing the trip lease with plaintiff (R-238), although
Bambrough denies recollection of any such discussion (R-2 86).
3. Clair Anderson testified he prepared part,
but not all, of a trip lease for the load plaintiff was to
transport on the date of the accident (R-211-213). He
indicated he signed that lease in the blocks marked "signature
of inspector" and "signature for certification" on the date
plaintiff was injured (R-213).

The signature by Anderson

in the block marked receipt by Carrier (Lessee) was not
written in until late 1974 or early 1975 (R-213-214). The
trip lease was not signed by the plaintiff, but was signed
by Bud Jolley, the replacement driver hired by D & L who
actually delivered the load, after plaintiff was injured
(R-246-248)•
4. When plaintiff arrived with the D & L truck
and trailer on the defendant Bethers1 business premises,
he was told by Bethers1 personnel to assist in transferring
the load. (R-301).

When plaintiff learned that the load was
-3-
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to be transferred he telephoned Mr. Leftwich of D & L
for instructions. Leftwich told him: "If that's their
procedure you do it." (R-302).

Thereafter plaintiff

and the defendant Shimizu proceeded to transfer the load
from the trailer owned by the defendant Bethers and on
to the trailer owned by D & L.
5. Approximately an hour and a half elapsed
from the time plaintiff and the defendant Shimizu began
transferring the load until the plaintiff was injured
(R-305).

No one else worked with them (Id.).
6.

Shimizu and plaintiff worked together to

transfer the load (R-292).

In effectuating the transfer

Shimizu would pick up the bundles of wood products with a
forklift, while plaintiff would pick up 2" X 4" pieces of
wood ("stickers") which would be placed under the bundles
on the D & L owned trailer.

Shimizu would pick up a bundle

with the forklift and plaintiff would take "stickers" from
the Bethers trailer or yard and set them on the load
Shimizu was carrying.

When the forklift moved next to the

D & L owned trailer, plaintiff would take the "stickers"
off the bundle and set them on the trailer deck so that
the bundles could be placed on the "stickers" (R-30 3).
7.

A short time prior to the accident, the tarps
-4- -
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to cover the load were placed on the forklift and an
attempt was made to unload the tarps on the top of the
load*

When the tarps wouldn't come off the forks,

plaintiff climbed onto the Bethers1 forklift to push
the tarps off (R-291).
8. Although plaintiff and Shimizu had loaded
the wood products on D & L owned vehicle at the time of
the accident, the tarps on the load had not been fastened
to the trailer prior to plaintifffs injury (R-308).

After

the injury the D & L replacement driver, Bud Jolley, had
to finish tarping the load and to tie it down, (R-246).
9.

Immediately prior to the accident and before

he had tied down the tarps, plaintiff mounted the running
board of the Bethers forklift, probably to tell the defendant
"Thanks for helping me to load," and to inform Shimizu to
"tell Ray [Bethers] that on the way back I will drop his
tarps off." (R-292).
10.

At trial the plaintiff did not object to the

Court giving proposition, no. 4 to the jury which read:
"At the time and place of the injury to
Clark Bambrough, Clark Bambrough and Danny
Shimizu were engaged in the same line of work
and labor [ed] together and in such personal
relations that they could exercise an influence
upon each other promotive of proper caution
in respect to their mutual safety and they were at
the time of the injury directly operating with

-5-
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each other in the business at hand, or they
were operating so that mutual duties brought
them into such co-association that they could
exercise an influence upon each other to
use proper caution and be so.situated in their
labor as to be able to supervise and watch
the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence
and carefulness." (R-30).
11.

The trial jury answered proposition no. 4

in the affirmative.
12.

On January 15, 1973 the defendant Shimizu

was an employee of the defendant Bethers (R-251-252).
13.

After the accident of January 15, 19 7 3

plaintiff received Workmens Compensation benefits (Bambrough
Dep. p. 48).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN PROPOSITION 4 OF THE SPECIAL VERDICT THE
TRIAL JURY FOUND FACTS TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT
PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANTS WERE IN THE "SAME EMPLOYMENT"
FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION PURPOSES. SINCE PLAINTIFF
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE SUBMISSION OF PROPOSITION 4 TO
THE JURY AND SINCE COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE
JURY'S FINDINGS ON THAT ISSUE, THE TRIAI< COURT JUDGMENT
DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
At the time of plaintiff's injury Section 35-1-62
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provided:
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"When any injury or death for which
compensation is payable under this title
shall have been caused by the wrongful act
or neglect of another person not in the same
employment, the injured employee, or in the case
of death his dependents, may claim compensation
and the injured employee or his heirs or personal
representatives may also have an action for
damages against such third person." (emphasis
added).
In 1975 this statute was amended, but it contained
the language cited in the previous paragraph at the time
of plaintiff's accident.

See Section 35-1-62, Utah

Code Annotated (Supp. 1975) .
This Court has noted that "same employment" does
not require that the injured person be hired or paid by
a defendant in order for the injured person to be in the
same employment with that defendant.

In Peterson v. Fowler,

27 Utah 2d 159, 164, 493 P.2d 997, 1000 (1973) this
court held:
" . . . 'Same Employment' as used in
our Workmen's Compensation Act means work
of the same general type and nature as that
concurrently being performed by the defendant
or its employees." (emphasis added).
In that same decision this court also set forth
the standard by which a trier of fact might determine whether
persons were in the same employment for Workmen's Compensation
purposes:
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"To be fellow servants, they must be
engaged in the same line of work and labor
together in such personal relations that they
can exercise an influence upon each other
promotive of proper caution in respect of their
mutual safety. They should be at the time of
the injury directly operating with each other
in the particular business at hand, or they must
be operating so that mutual duties bring them
into such co-asociation that they may exercise
an influence upon each other to use proper
caution and be so situated in their labor to
some extent as to be able to supervise and watch
the conduct of each other as to skill, diligence
and carefulness. When workmen are so engaged,
we think they are working in the same employment."
Id. at 164, 493 P.2d at 1000. (emphasis added).
In the Peterson decision the decedent's estate
sought to sue a subcontractor for plaintiff's alleged wrongful
death.

The decedent was hired by the general contractor, but

also did work for the subcontractor.

At the completion of the

work the subcontractor was to reimburse the general contractor
for services rendered the subcontractor by the deceased.

It

was unclear at the time of the decedent's death exactly what
work the decedent was performing.

The Supreme Court affirmed

the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the
subcontractor-respondent:
"In the instant case if at the time of the
accident the deceased was applying tile on
behalf of the respondent. . .he would be an
employee and plaintiffs could not maintain the
action. On the other hand, if at the time of the
accident he was cleaning beams and hubs on behalf
of the general contractor, the plaintiffs couM
not maintain the action because he was engaged in
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the same employment as the employees of the
respondent." Peterson, supra, at 165, 493 P.2d
at 1001.
This court went on to note that the plaintiff had
the burden of showing that the decedent was neither employed
by nor in the same employment with the respondent. Id.
In proposition no. 4 of the special verdict the
jury was asked to find whether or not the plaintiff and
the defendant Shimizu were engaged in the same line of work,
laboring together so that they could influence each other
with respect to their mutual safety and situated so as to
supervise and watch the skill, diligence and care of the
other at the time of the accident. The essential factual
elements of the Peterson test were thus submitted to them.
The jury found as true the factual bases set forth by this
court in the Peterson decision, and respondents respectfully
submit that the legal conclusion required by the jury
finding on proposition no. 4 is that plaintiff and the
defendants were in the "same employment" pursuant to
Section 31-1-62 as it existed at the time of the injury.
Plaintiff did not object to proposition no. 4
being submitted to the jury (R-328).
-9-
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i

Furthermore, the evidence presented provided
a legitimate basis for the jury's finding.

It was

,

undisputed that the defendant Shimizu was employed by the
defendant Bethers.

Both Bethers and D & L Corporation

were in the trucking business. At the time of the

{

accident plaintiff and Shimizu were working together on
a common project, namely the transfer of the wood products
from the Bethers owned vehicle to the D & L vehicle.

They

{

had worked together on that project for about an hour
and a half and plaintiff admits that when he voluntarily
boarded the forklift immediately prior to the accident
he probably told Shimizu "Thanks for helping me to load."
(R-292).
While they were working together, plaintiff from
time to time would make suggestions to Shimizu on how to
align the load (R-302-303). After the wood products
had been placed on the trailer Bambrough had driven, he
and Shimizu worked together to have the covering tarps
lifted upon the load. And when the tarps would not come
off the forks, plaintiff climbed onto the forklift Shimizu
was operating to push the tarps off the load.

And plaintiff

says he probably mentioned return of the tarps to Shimizu
just prior to the accident. (R-292).
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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{

These foregoing facts provide a credible basis
for the finding that the two did work together at the
time of the accident in such a manner as to make
plaintiff and defendants in the same employment for
Workmens Compensation purposes.
Indeed, even if plaintiff were correct in
arguing that the trial court erred in submitting
propositions 1, 2 and 3 (and defendants do not contend
that any such error was committed), the jury finding on
proposition no* 4, conclusively establishes a factual
basis for holding that plaintiff and defendants were in
the same employment.

This finding would provide an

independent basis for the trial court's judgment of
dismissal even if the trial court had erred in submitting
to the jury the propositions on whether plaintiff was
an employee of the defendant Bethers.
POINT II
THERE WAS CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL
COURT'S FINDING THAT WORKMENS COMPENSATION WAS PLAINTIFF'S
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
SUBMITTING PROPOSITION 1 TO THE JURY ON A SPECIAL VERDICT.

-11-
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A portion of Section 35-1-60 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provides:
"Exclusive remedy against employer, or
officer, agent or employee-occupational disease
excepted. The right to recover compensation
pursuant to the provisions of this title for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether
resulting in death or not, shall be the
exclusive remedy against any officer, agent
or employee of the employer and the liability
of the employer imposed by this act shall be
in place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such
employee . • ., on account of any accident
or injury or death, in any way contracted,
sustained, aggravated or incurred by such
employee in the course of or because of or
arising out of his employment, and no action
at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent or employee of the
employer based upon any accident, injury or death
of an employee . . . "
The language of the statute is clear and cases
interpreting this section have often held that the Workmens
Compensation remedy is exclusive insofar as a claim by an
employee against an employer or his employee is concerned•
e.g. Peterson v. Fowler, supra.

Of course, the crucial

question is whether there was sufficient evidence for the
trial court to find that plaintiff was Bethers1 employee for
Workmens Compensation purposes at the time of the accident.
Section 35-1-42 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
provides in part:

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Employers enumerated and defined Regularly employed - Independent contractors.
The following shall constitute employers
subject to the provisions of this title:

(2). . .
Where any employer procures any work to
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor
over whose work he retains supervision and control,
and such work is a part or process in the trade
or business of the employer, such contractor, and
all persons employed by him, and all subcontractors
under him, and all persons employed by any such
subcontractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning
of this section, employees of such original
employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged
in the performance of work as an independent
contractor shall be deemed an employer within the
meaning of this section. The term "independent
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any
person, association or corporation engaged in the
performance of any work for another, who, while so
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that
pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject
to the rule or control of the employer, is engaged
only in the performance of a definite job or piece
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in
effecting a result in accordance with the employer's
design." (emphasis supplied except for emphasis in
title).
From a reading of the statute it appears that two
major conditions must be met for an employee of a contractor
or subcontractor to be employees of the original employer.
First, the employer is to retain supervision and control over
the work of the subcontractor.

Second, the work of the

subcontractor must be a part or process of the business of
the employer, On the supervision and control issue, it is

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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clear that the right of control is the determinative
condition, regardless of whether that right is actually
exercised or not. Parkinson v. Industrial Commission, 110
Utah 309, 313-314, 172 P.2d 136 (1946); Utah Fire & Clay
Company v. Industrial Commission, 86 Utah 1, 2, 40 P.2d 183,
186 (1935).

See also Gallegos v. Stringham, 21 Utah 2d 139,

34, 442 P.2d 31, 34 (1968).
,/

With respect to the first precondition, namely

the right of Bethers to control plaintiff's working actions
at the time of the accident, the trial jury specifically found
that Bethers had that right of control.

(R-29).

Although

plaintiff claims he never specifically consented to be
Bethers employee, the record contains evidence that D & L
Corporation did recognize Bethers1 right to control plaintiff
and consented to the exercise of that control. Plaintiff
testified that when he was informed that the load would have
to be transferred onto the vehicle owned by D & L, he called
Mr. Leftwich of D & L and asked what he should do.

(R-302).

Plaintiff indicated Leftwich told him: "If that is their
procedure you do it."

(Id.).

A clearer manifestation of

D & L's acknowledgement and authorization of Bethers1 right
to control plaintiff during the loading and operation of the
trailer is difficult to imagine.

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It should be noted that plaintiff commenced
working with Shimizu to effectuate the load transfer
at a time designated by Bethers' employees. (R-300).
Neither plaintiff nor D & L unilaterally determined
when, how or in what manner the wood products would be
loaded*

Plaintiff indicated he balked when Bethers'

personnel indicated the load would be transferred, but
when he called Mr* Leftwich of D & L about that matter,
Leftwich in effect told him that if Bethers wanted him
to assist in transferring the load he should do it.
(R-302).
Regardless of whether plaintiff himself knew
he was or consented to be an employee of defendant Bethers
for Workmens Compensation purposes, there is credible
evidence that D & L Corporation recognized Bethers right
to control plaintiff's working actions in a project duly
contracted between D & L and Bethers.

D & L and Bethers

appear to have been in the trucking business, and D & L
agreed, at least orally, to lease its equipment to
Bethers for the Colorado delivery (R-207-208).
In a number of cases involving rather similar facts

-15-
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to those involved in this lawsuit the Utah Supreme Court
has held that persons not actually hired by a defendant, might
still be his employees for Workmens Compensation purposes if
he had the right to control their work and they were engaged
in the work of the employer at the time of the accident. In
Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Company, 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d
616 (1963), the plaintiff was hired by Coker Contruction
Company as a miner to work on a diversion tunnel. The court
found that Coker and the defendant Kiewit had contracted with
each other to join their efforts in constructing the tunnel
and share profits or losses from the enterprise.

Apparently,

plaintiff worked rather closely with Kiewit employees and was
directed where to drill his jackhammer by Kiewit engineers.
The Supreme Court reversed a lower court denial of
Kiewit's motion for summary judgment, and held that Coker and
Kiewit, having agreed to join in the construction of the tunnel
and to share profits, became partners and the two companies
(

were regarded as the employing unit.

15 Utah 2d at 23, 386

P.2d at 617-618. The court held that employees of both
companies would be considered as engaged in the same employment
and that Workmens Compensation was plaintiff's exclusive
remedy.

Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment

should have been granted.
%

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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i

In Smith v. Alfred Brown Company, 27 Utah 2d 155,
493 P.2d 994 (1972), plaintiff, hired as a brickmason by a
subcontractor of the defendant, sued the defendant general
contractor for personal injuries suffered in a fall on the
construction project.

The agreement between the general

contractor and the subcontractor provided generally that
the subcontractor was to promptly and diligently prosecute
the work when it became available or at such other times
as the contractor should direct.
In affirming a trial court award of summary judgment
in favor of the defendant general contractor the Supreme
Court held:
". . .the trial court was justified in
viewing the situation thus: that the defendant
general contractor Brown had sufficient supervision and control over the 'subcontractors under
him1 [i.e. Ashton] that 'all persons employed by
any such subcontractor1 [i.e. plaintiff Smith]
should be deemed an employee of the general
contractor [defendant Brown] and that consequently
the plaintiff would be covered by workmen's
compensation as an employee of the latter and
thus precluded from maintaining this suit.
Accordingly the summary judgment was properly
granted." (Id. at 158-159, 483 P.2d at 996.)
And in Adamson v. Okland Construction Company, 29
Utah 2d 286, 509 P.2d 805 (1973), the Supreme Court affirmed
a summary judgment in favor of a defendant general contractor.
In that case it appeared that the general contractor had the
-17-
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right to take over the work of an electrical subcontractor (who employed the decedent) if in the general
contractor's opinion the subcontractor did not proceed
satisfactorily with its work.

The general contractor

had the right to direct work sequence by the subconstractors, to make changes in work done by them and
to order work stoppages.

This overall supervisory

right was sufficient to make the decedent an employee
of the general contractor for Workmens Compensation
purposes.

Okland Construction, supra at 289-290, 508

P.2d at 807-808. In that decision the court held that
the right of supervision and control and not necessarily
the degree to which the right was exercised was determinative
Id. at 289, 508 P.2d at 807. See also Gallegos v. Stringham,
supra.
In proposition no. 1 the jury was asked to answer
whether:
"Ray Bethers had the right to supervise
and control the activities of Clark Bambrough
in relation to the loading of the trailer and
the operation of the same at the time and
place of the accident January 15, 1973."
(R-29).
The jury found proposition no. 1 to be true. (Id.).
-18Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The proposition as given comported with the
language of Section 35-1-42(2).

That section uses

the term "over whose work he retains supervision and
control."

If, as appellant apparently concedes, Bethers

had the right to supervise the loading of the cargo and
operation of the trailer in his yard, (Appellants Brief
p. 13), and if as plaintiff testified Leftwich told him
to "If that's their procedure you do it", it would appear
that Bethers had rights of both supervision and control
over plaintiff.
Appellant refers to no Utah cases for its
assertion that the general employer must fully and completely
release control before his employees can be employees of
another for Workmen's Compensation purposes. The Kiewit,
supra, Smith, supra and Peterson, supra, decisions of this
court seem to indicate a clear policy in this state that a
person can be paid, hired and on the job for one employer,
yet be an employee of another for Workmens Compensation
purposes if the latter employer retains the right to
supervise and control the worker's activities at the time
of the injury*
There was evidence to support the finding that
the respondent Bethers had supervision and control over
appellant's working actions. Proposition no. 1 properly set
-19Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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forth the essential factual matters relevant to employees
for Workmens Compensation purposes.

The judgment of

dismissal based on the jury answer to proposition no. 1
should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN:
1) RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE DOCUMENTS 1-D,
8-D AND 9-D;
2) RECEIVING INTO EVIDENCE DOCUMENTS 2-D,
3-D AND 4-D;
3) FAILING TO GIVE CERTAIN OF PLAINTIFF'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS:
4)) SUBMITTING PROPOSITIONS 2 AND 3 OF THE
SPECIAL VERDICT TO THE JURY.
1.

The trial court did not err in receiving

into evidence Exhibit 1-D (Trip Lease dated September 7,
1972), and Exhibits 8-D and 9-D

(Driver's Dailey Logs for

Septmeber 7 and 8, 1972) .
At trial plaintiff objected to the receipt in
evidence of Exhibit 1-D, a trip lease dated September 7,
1972.

That objection was based on the document's lack of

relevance since it predated the accident in question by approximately four months (R-269).

Although plaintiff denied the
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genuiness of his signature, the defendant Bethers
identified his own signature on that document (R-265)•

There

was some indication that plaintiff's purported signature
on the document 1-D was written in by D & L personnel
because plaintiff had not properly turned in his paperwork
(R-320).
In any event, Section 78-25-9(3) of the Utah
Code Annotated provides that a writing may be proved by its
subscribing witness.

Since Bethers signed the document

and identified his signature, a foundation for admission
of the document was established•

Respondent contends

the document was relevant, first, because it tended to
evidence a course of prior lease dealings between Bethers
and D & L, and second, because it reflected on plaintiff's
ability to recall. Plaintiff testified he had no recollection of a trip lease on the September, 1972 load he
picked up at Bethers (R-297).
The relevance of Exhibit 1-D was buttressed by
documents 8-D and 9-D, which were apparent driver daily
logs prepared by plaintiff and which specifically referred
to an "RB lease". Plaintiff admitted that his signature
on those logs was genuine (R-323).

Those documents, are

also relevant to show prior dealings between D & L and Bethers.
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They also were relevant to show plaintiff's prior dealings
with Bethers and tended to be some evidence of his ability
to recall.
2.

The trial court did not err in recieving into

evidence documents 2-D (Yellow Copy), 3-D (White Copy and
4-D (Pint Copy) of the Trip Lease document dated January
15, 1973.
At trial defendants offered in evidence triplicate
copies of a trip lease dated January 15, 1973. Clair
Anderson, Bethers then dispatcher, testified he prepared
a portion of the lease and signed it in two places on
January 15, 1973.

(R-211-213).

There was one signature

of Anderson added to the lease documents in late 1974 or
early 1975, after the lawsuit had been filed (R-213-214).
The lease documents were also signed by Bud Jolley, the
replacement driver who delivered the load plaintiff would
have had he not been injured (R-233, 246-248).

The lease

documents applied to the delivery plaintiff was supposed
to have made. (R-233-234).
The trial court deceived Exhibits 2-D, 3-D and 4-D
into evidence, but only for the limited purpose of showing
dates of and parties to the lease (R-321-322).

The

printed terms and conditions of the lease were not to be
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considered by the jury (Id,).
Respondents contend the admitted documents were
relevant to the limited purposes for which they were
received.

Testimony at trial dealt with dates, parties to

and signatures on the lease. Bambrough's claimed lack of
knowledge of the lease,,would not bind D & L, since its
replacement driver admitted he signed the document. The
trial court had a reasonable basis to conclude the
documents were relevant to the purposes for which they were
received.

The documents were supported by a foundation

justifying their admission.

Respondent also questions whether

the receipt of the documents for the limited purposes
permitted by the trial court had any substantial effect on
the jury's finding or the cburt's judgment.

Rule 4(b) Utah

Rules of Evidence.
3. The trial court did not err in refusing to
give certain of the instructions plaintiff requested.
The plaintiff-appellant objected to the trial
court's refusal to give seven (7) of the instructions
plaintiff requested.

Respondent contends the trial court

did not err in refusing to give those instructions.

-23-
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In Instruction No, 2 plaintiff asked the court
to instruct the jury that before Bethers could transport
equipment, the lease needed to contain certain items,
including a 30 day minimum time as per ICC regulations
which plaintiff claims apply.

However, Bethers and D & L

compliance or lack of compliance with ICC regulations,
would not create or preclude a lease arrangement binding
between them.

The status of the contract between Bethers

and D & L for Workmens Compensation purposes is a matter
of state, and not federal administrative, law.

Insofar

as Bethers and D & L were concerned, and particularly
for State Workmen's Compensation purposes, federal administrative law should not affect the essential validity
of their contract with each other.
Plaintiff also claims the trial court erred in
refusing to instruct that:
INSTRUCTION NO. 3
An employee is one who is hired and paid a
salary, a wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform
the employer's work as directed by the employer
and who is subject to a comparatively high
degree of control in performing those duties.
Respondent contends that for the court to have
given such an instruction would have been improper, since
for Workmens Compensation purposes a worker can be paid
and hired by a subcontractor, but still be an employee of
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the general contractor. Utah Code Annotated 35-1-42;
Kiewit, supra; Brown, supra.

Also the proposed instruction

failed to indicate that for Workmens Compensation purposes
the right to control, whether exercised or not, is the
material element,

Parkinson, supra; Gallagos, supra.

Appellant also asked the court to instruct that:
INSTRUCTION NO. 4
The relation of employer and employee, for
Workmen's Compensation purposes, cannot
exist between the Defendant Ray Bethers
and a loaned employee such as the Plaintiff
Clark Bambrough, without the following being
present:
(a) Consent on the part of Plaintiff
to work for the Defendant Ray Bethers;
(b) Actual entry by the Plaintiff upon
the work of and for the Defendant Ray Bethers,
pursuant to a contract so to do;
(c) Power of the Defendant Ray Bethers
to control the details of the work to be
performed and to determine how the work shall
be done and whether it shall stop or continue.
Respondents contend this proposed instruction was
properly not given since it concludes as a matter of law
that plaintiff could not be an employee for Workmens
Compensation purposes unless he consented to be an employee
of Bethers and there was a contract between them.

Section

35-1-42(2) does not require consent of the employee and neither
do decisions of this court.

Brown, supra, Kiewit, supra.
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Indeed, decisions of this court clearly indicate there
need not be a contract between the general contractor and
employees hired and paid by a subcontractor to make those
persons employees of the general contractor for Workmens
Compensation purposes * Brown, supra; Kiewit, supra;
Peterson, supra.
Appellant also contends the court committed
error in failing to give these two instructions:
INSTRUCTION NO. 5
For Workmens Compensation purposes, an
employee cannot have an employer thrust
upon him against his will or without his
knowledge.
INSTRUCTION NO. 6
"Control" must be authoritative direction
and control, not mere suggestions as to
details or necessary cooperation.
For reasons heretofore cited Respondents contend
these requested instructions did not comport with the
statutes concerning and decisions of this court interpreting
the Workmens Compensation law of this state.
Finally, plaintiff assigns as error the refusal
of the court to give these instructions
INSTRUCTION NO. 7
Control, or lack of control, of the employee,
while of the greatest significance, is not
conclusive.

-26-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INSTRUCTION NO. 8
The mere fact that Plaintiff's regular
employer, D & L Corporation, permits some
division of control does not give rise to
the inference that he has surrendered control.
With respect to proposed instruction no. 7 the
plain language of Section 35-1-42(2) speaks against the
proposition plaintiff requested the court give.
And no Utah cases counsel for defendants have been*
able to locate supports requested instruction 8's language.
Indeed, the factual holding of this court's decisions in
Okland, supra, Smith,

supra seems to suggest that the law

in this state is contrary to the propositions outlined in
Instruction no. 8.
4.

The trial court did not commit the error

appellant claims it did in submitting propositions 2 and
3 to the jury on the special verdict.
Appellant claims it was error for the court not
to include in propositions 2 and 3 whether plaintiff was
working for defendant Bethers or D & L Corporation.

However,

in both propositions the jury was asked about plaintiff's
actions "for and on behalf of Ray Bethers Trucking Company."
For Workmens Compensation purposes the material consideration
was Bethers right to control plaintiff, not who hired plaintiff,
who paid him, and who plaintiff thought his employer was.
In any event, the jury after having heard all the testimony
-27-
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i

concluded in sufficient number that both propositions
could be found true.

Since there was ample evidence to

support those propositions they should be allowed to
remain undisturbed•
CONCLUSIONS
Of central importance is the fact that plaintiff
failed to object to the submission of proposition no. 4
i

to the jury, which proposition set forth the factual test for
"same employment" within the meaning of Section 35-1-62 as
it read at the time of plaintiff's injury.

The jury found

those facts to be true, and those findings, by themselves,
constitute an independent basis for sustaining the lower
court judgment.
With respect to the disputed question at the time
of the accident of whether appellant was an employee of the
defendant Bethers, the jury appears to have been persuaded
that Bethers did have the crucial right to control Bambrough's
working actions at the time the injury occurred.
It is respectfully submitted that the facts found
by the jury supported the trial court's dismissal of this
action and are consistent with numerous Workmens Compensation
decisions of this court•
The objections to the admission of the documents
and the failure to give the instructions plaintiff wished, do not,
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in respeondents' opinion, constitute grounds for
reversing the lower court judgment or having this matter,
once fully considered by the jury,retried.
The lower court judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
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Attorneys for the defendants and
respondents
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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